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 and Inertia in Charitable Giving  
 
 
“Never say I’ll go tomorrow. When you get a chance to go fishing, go. If you 
wait until tomorrow, tomorrow will drag into next week and next week will 
drag into next month and next month into next year and some day it will be too 
late.” (Orman, 2004: attributed to T. Trueblood) 
1. Introduction. 
This is not actually a paper about fishing, but about giving money to charity. The above 
quote, however, sums up what this paper is about if “go fishing” is replaced with “donate”. 
Just as going fishing can be put off to another day, so can donating money to charity. This 
paper analyzes whether people are subject to such inertia with respect to charitable giving. In 
particular we ask whether some people intend to give money to charity, but simply never get 
around to doing so? For example, someone may read an email asking for a donation and is 
inclined to donate, but as she is busy preparing for a meeting decides to wait until after the 
meeting to click on the link to the charity’s website and enter her credit card details. It is then 
possible, that having delayed making the donation once, she will do so again, until the 
opportunity to donate has passed. 
Why do people postpone making their donations? Does the presence of transaction costs 
combined with a high opportunity cost of time at the moment of solicitation reduce 
donations?1 Both questions have important policy implications as finding ways to reduce 
transaction costs, and the potential for inertia, could increase donations to charity.  
The three issues mentioned in the title of the current paper go hand in hand. We conjecture 
that inertia is likely to exist in the presence of transaction costs when two other conditions are 
satisfied simultaneously: (1) making a donation does not have to be made on the spot but can 
be postponed until later (which is usually the case with requests sent out by mail or email) 
and (2) the opportunity cost of donors’ time at the moment they receive the request is high 
relative to the magnitude of transaction costs. The intuition is that if someone could transfer 
                                                            
1. While nicely capturing inertia, there is no obvious role for transaction costs in the fishing 
example. 
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money to a charity without this taking up any time and effort, there would be less reason to 
postpone the actual donation, once the decision to donate has been made. However, if po-
tential donors are approached when they are busy (when their opportunity cost of time is 
high), even a small transaction cost may be enough to prevent them from donating immedi-
ately. Having postponed donating once, they may do so again, until the opportunity to donate 
has passed (i.e. inertia may result). A straight forward corollary is that if potential donors are 
approached when they are not busy, they might choose to make a donation right away even if 
it involves a transaction cost. Finally, if there is no opportunity to postpone the decision (e.g. 
as in street collections) there is no scope for inertia. We acknowledge that a “rational” donor 
would not suffer from inertia, but we conjecture that “behavioral” donors may do so. The 
behavior of rational donors would, however, be affected by transaction costs and by the 
interaction of transaction costs and the opportunity cost of time. 
Inertia, as we interpret it, means situations in which people have the best intentions of doing 
something that they want to do (e.g. giving to charity), but because this does not have to be 
done immediately, putting it off, and then not getting around to doing so. This is similar to 
status quo bias, that is, doing nothing, or not changing one’s previous decisions, e.g. choosing 
the default option in a retirement savings scheme or health insurance plan (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988; Handel, 2013). Where inertia, as we define it, differs to status quo bias is 
that with inertia a conscious decision has been made to do something, but the transaction cost 
of doing so delays implementing the decision.2 Our interpretation of inertia also differs to 
procrastination and self-control problems due to inconsistent time preferences, where people 
find reasons to put off doing onerous tasks that generate immediate costs and future rewards 
and to willpower depletion (modelled by O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; Halevy, 2008; Harris 
and Laibson, 2013; Dekel and Lipman, 2011; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006; Ozdenoren, 
Salant, and Silverman, , 2012 and experimentally studied by Burger, Charness, and Lynham, 
2011; Martinsson, Myrseth, and Wollbrant, 2012 among others). Inertia, by contrast, involves 
making a conscious decision to do something the person wants to do (e.g. donating money to 
charity because of the warm glow, or because the donor cares about the recipient’s payoff), 
but not following through because it does not have to be done immediately. As the warm 
                                                            
2. We acknowledge that Handel (2013) uses the term inertia to describe what we, and others 
(e.g. Samuleson and Zeckhauser, 1988)   refer to as status quo bias. 
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glow is likely received at the same time the donation is made, this suggests there is little 
scope for the separation of benefits and costs modelled by O’Donoghue and Rabin.3,4  
To study the impact of the opportunity cost of time, transaction costs and inertia on charitable 
giving, we nest our experimental manipulations in the Dictator Game. First implemented by 
Eckel and Grossman (1996), there now exists a large body of literature which uses Dictator 
Games to analyze giving to charity. Questions explored include the effects of rebates versus 
dollar-for-dollar matching of donations (see, for example, Eckel and Grossman, 2003; Davis, 
2006), public recognition of donations (Karlan and McConnell, 2012), telling participants the 
charity will spend the money in poor countries (Brañas-Garza, 2006), providing information 
on why the country in which recipients live is poor (Etang, Fielding and Knowles, 2012), 
manipulating the perceived worthiness of recipients (Fong and Luttmer, 2011) and directing 
donations to an identifiable victim (Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic, 2007). However, in all of 
these studies subjects decide while in the laboratory whether to donate and then make that 
payment immediately. Hence, there is no possibility for inertia, as the payment cannot be 
delayed. There are also no transaction costs, as participants who choose not to donate do not 
get to leave the lab any earlier than those who do donate. However, in everyday life, giving 
money to a charity nearly always involves a transaction cost, for example, writing out a check 
and posting it, or visiting a website and taking the time to enter credit card details. Outside 
the laboratory there is also the possibility of inertia, as making the payment can often be put 
off to another time.  
Testing our hypotheses requires modifying the standard Dictator Game to control for both the 
presence of transaction costs and the magnitude of the opportunity cost of time when the 
solicitation is received.  We introduce a transaction cost by having subjects who wish to 
donate walk to another location on campus to make their donations. We refer to the amount 
of time taken to walk to the donation box as the “nominal transaction cost”. The “effective 
transaction cost” depends on both the nominal transaction cost and the opportunity cost of 
                                                            
3. In O’Donoghue and Rabin’s model people have to undertake a costly activity once. With 
charitable giving, people have the choice of whether to donate or not. 
4. Breman (2011) conducts a field experiment and finds people already making regular 
monthly payments to a charity are more likely to agree to increase donations to the charity 
if the increase does not take place for some time. In this case, the warm glow would occur 
when the pledge to increase donations is made, but the cost is delayed, creating the 
potential for inconsistent time preferences. However, in most cases with charitable 
donations, there is no such pre-commitment and the warm glow likely occurs at the time 
the payment is actually made. 
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time. To control for the opportunity cost of time at the time of the solicitation we develop a 
novel procedure that allows us to vary whether (i) subjects can donate immediately after the 
experimental session, but when they had expected to still be in the laboratory taking part in 
the experiment (i.e. the experimental session finished earlier than advertised), which serves as 
a proxy for a low opportunity cost of time, or (ii) whether the donation cannot be made until 
the following day, which rules out donating when we know the opportunity cost of time is 
low. If inertia exists, giving people more time to donate will reduce donations, especially if 
the opportunity cost of subjects’ time when the solicitation is received is high. Hence, in the 
experiment we also vary the amount of time the subjects have to make a donation. In a field 
setting it is difficult to observe this opportunity cost at the time of the solicitation. However, 
in our laboratory experiment we are able to do so. Moreover, we can also compare donations 
in the presence of transaction costs against a baseline where transaction costs and inertia are 
both zero.  
Our baseline treatment is the standard Dictator Game with a charity as a recipient, with no 
transaction costs or inertia. In various treatments we incorporate a transaction cost by 
requiring those who wish to make a donation to place the donation in a secure box located a 
short walk away. In some treatments subjects are able to make the donation at a time when 
we know the opportunity cost of time should be low; in other treatments subjects are only 
able to make a donation when the opportunity cost of time is likely higher, which varies the 
effective transaction cost.  
In the first of these treatments subjects have one hour following the advertised completion 
time of the experimental session to make a donation. Crucial to our design is that the 
experimental sessions had been advertised to take one hour, but actually only took 35-40 
minutes. Hence we know that subjects had time to walk to the box to make a donation during 
the time they had planned to be in the laboratory (hereafter “planned lab time”). As they were 
planning on participating in an experiment during this time, the opportunity cost of their time 
is low. We designed this treatment to serve as an analogue of, in everyday life, receiving a 
solicitation from a charity when you have the time to donate, if you choose to. The potential 
for inertia in this treatment is extremely low, so we interpret any difference between the 
baseline and this treatment as being due to transaction costs. 
In our second treatment we introduce the potential for inertia by giving subjects 25 hours 
following the advertised completion of the lab session to make a donation (i.e. they have 24 
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hours longer than in the first treatment). Any difference in donations between this treatment 
and the first treatment is likely due to inertia. However, as participants had the option in both 
treatments of donating promptly, at a time when their opportunity cost of time was low, the 
potential for inertia may still be reasonably low.  
Our first two treatments were designed to analyze the case where people have the time to 
make a donation immediately following a solicitation. However, in everyday life requests 
from charities are often received when people are too busy to respond immediately. To mimic 
this situation in the lab we introduced a third treatment where subjects could only donate the 
next day; i.e. we ruled out the option of donating immediately, thereby creating an infinite 
opportunity cost of time at the moment of solicitation. As subjects who want to donate need 
to do so in their own time, rather than during planned lab time, it is likely that this represents 
a higher opportunity cost of their time, and hence a higher effective transaction cost, for most 
subjects compared to the first two treatments. Not allowing subjects to donate until the 
following day also creates a higher potential for inertia than in the second treatment. 
Our fourth treatment is the same as the third, except that subjects are given an additional six 
days to make donations. That is they can make donations any day for the next week, starting 
the day following the experiment. As subjects have been given longer to donate than in the 
third treatment, the potential for inertia is higher in the fourth treatment. The effective 
transaction cost cannot be any higher in the fourth treatment than the third, as the payment 
options in the third treatment are a subset of those in the fourth, so if donations are lower in 
the fourth treatment, this would be evidence of inertia. 
When we ran the experiment we found that average donations were sufficiently low in the 
third treatment that it would be difficult to observe a statistically significant lower level of 
donations in the fourth treatment. Hence, we postponed running the fourth treatment and re-
calibrated the design to increase average donations across treatments, and then conducted 
both the third and fourth treatments using the new procedures. This second study took place 
three months after the first study. Hence Study One includes the baseline and first three 
treatments, with Study Two including the third (representing a new baseline) and fourth 
treatments. The main focus of Study One is on the role of transaction costs and how these 
interact with the opportunity cost of time. Study One sheds some light on the conditions 
under which inertia is likely to exist, but it is Study Two that speaks more directly to whether 
inertia is likely to reduce donations to charity. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
literature, sections 3 and 4 respectively present the experimental design and results of Study 
One while sections 5 and 6 present the design and results of Study Two. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Literature Review. 
Field experiments have been used to analyze a range of issues with respect to charitable 
giving; for example, the effect of lead donations (List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002), lotteries 
versus voluntary contributions (Landry, Lange, List, Price, and Rupp, 2006), whether 
receiving a large number of requests irritates potential donors (Van Diepen, Donkers, and 
Franses, 2009), reasons as to why donors support multiple charities (Null, 2011; de Oliveira, 
Croson, and Eckel, 2011) and the correlation between giving and socio-demographic 
characteristics (Bekkers, 2007). There are also two field experiments on the effect of 
transaction costs in the context of charitable giving: Huck and Rasul (2010) and Meer and 
Rigbi (2013). However, these studies are unable to control for the opportunity cost of time at 
the time the solicitation is received.  
Huck and Rasul (2010) separate transaction costs into two components: ex-ante transaction 
costs and ex-post transaction costs. Ex-ante transaction costs are defined as the time taken to 
consider a request for a charitable donation (e.g. read a letter or brochure) and the time taken 
to make a decision as to whether to give. Ex-post transaction costs are defined as the costs 
associated with making a donation (e.g. writing a check and posting it).5 Huck and Rasul’s 
paper involves two separate field experiments. In the first experiment (“the reminder 
experiment”) letters are sent to potential donors asking for donations for a youth project run 
by the Bavarian Opera House.6 Six weeks following the original letter, a reminder letter was 
sent out to 2/3 of those who had not yet donated. Huck and Rasul argue that there are only 
two reasons why someone who did not respond to the initial appeal may have responded to 
the reminder: (1) preferences have altered, or (2) the reminder triggered a new draw from the 
same distribution of transaction costs (e.g. perhaps they were not as busy when the reminder 
letter arrived). As the reminder letter provided no new information about the appeal, and the 
authors claim it is unlikely anyone’s preferences would have changed in a short period of 
                                                            
5. In our setup, subjects incur ex-ante transactions costs in the lab (reading/listening to the 
instructions and likely also making a decision) whereas ex-post transaction costs are 
incurred by having to walk to the donation box. 
6. To test the external validity of their result a similar study was conducted using the Royal 
Opera House in Covent Garden. 
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time, any response to the second letter is interpreted as being due to lower transaction costs at 
the time the second letter was received. There were a significant number of responses to the 
reminder letter, which they argue implies the presence of transaction costs. The idea that 
people face different transaction costs at different times is consistent with our contention that 
when people are asked to make a donation they will sometimes have time to do so 
immediately, and sometimes will not. If they do not have time now, and postpone making the 
donation, it is possible they will never get around to donating.  
In Huck and Rasul’s second experiment, a request letter is sent out for a separate fund raising 
project for the Bavarian Opera House. Different treatments provide different payment options 
(a bank transfer  in one treatment versus a pre-filled bank transfer form and paying by credit 
card over the phone in another treatment) to test for the effect of ex-post transaction costs and 
differing levels of information on the envelope the letter is delivered in to test for the effect of 
ex-ante transaction costs. Evidence is found that ex-post transaction costs affect response 
rates, but not mean donations. 
Meer and Rigbi (2013) analyze transactions costs in the context of whether people donating 
money to entrepreneurs in developing countries, through the Kiva online platform, are more 
likely to donate money to projects where the information posted about the project is in the 
donor’s own language. They argue that donors having to translate the information themselves 
represents a transaction cost. This study is a randomized natural experiment, as for a period 
of time in 2009 Kiva volunteers translated a proportion of the non-English-language project 
profiles into English, with it being determined at random which profiles were translated. 
Meer and Rigbi find evidence of a transaction cost effect, for donors living in a country 
where English is the main language. Note, however, that Meer and Rigbi are not so much 
focusing on the effect of transaction costs on the decision of whether to donate or not (as 
those using the website have incurred a fixed cost of signing up, and the fact that they are 
browsing the website indicates a desire to donate). Instead they are focusing on the effect of 
transaction costs on the decision of who to donate to, conditional on having an interest in 
making a donation. 
We are unaware of any existing studies (either field or lab experiments) which analyze the 
role of inertia with respect to charitable giving. However, there is a literature on the role of 
inertia more generally. Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2002) compare data from an 
online survey of workers employed by a large US company, which asked if workers planned 
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to increase contributions to their company’s 401(k) savings scheme, with the company’s 
administrative records on employees’ actual contributions. They find that only 14 percent of 
those who said they planned to increase their contributions in the next few months did so, 
leading them to conclude that “respondents overwhelmingly do not follow through on their 
good intentions.” (p.74). Leventhal, Singer and Jones (1965) provide Yale students with 
information about tetanus and then ask them if they plan to get inoculated. The majority of 
students said they planned to get inoculated, but only a small minority did.  
These existing studies on inertia test for an inertia effect by comparing peoples’ intentions 
with their subsequent actions (e.g. do people who say they plan to get inoculated do so). Our 
approach for testing for inertia is somewhat different, in that we focus on whether giving 
people more time to donate reduces donations. We adopt this approach for two reasons. The 
first is we suspect that getting subjects to state their intentions, albeit anonymously, to the 
researchers may actually reduce the amount of inertia. That is, having made a written 
commitment to donate subjects may be more likely to do so. As most everyday solicitation 
methods do not ask for a commitment in this way, we also do not ask for such a commitment 
in case this masks the inertia effect we are trying to identify. The second reason for our 
approach is that, from a policy perspective, we think it is an interesting question to consider 
whether it is possible to give people too much time to donate. 
To the best of our knowledge, the question of whether inertia affects charitable giving has not 
been analyzed in the literature. However, as discussed above, there is evidence that inertia 
affects other types of behavior. We suggest that giving to charity may be similar. Many 
people, upon receiving requests from a charity, may intend to make a donation, but they 
simply never get around to doing so. There are two field experiments analyzing the effect of 
transaction costs on charitable giving, and these make a valuable contribution to the 
literature. We see analyzing transaction costs using a laboratory experiment as a useful 
complement to these existing studies. Our experimental design allows us to control for the 
opportunity cost of time of subjects and to introduce transaction costs, which are both crucial 
when analyzing inertia. In our setting we are able to implement treatments where we know 
subjects have time on their hands to donate immediately upon receiving the solicitation, and 
treatments where we rule out the possibility of donating immediately (the analogue of the 
everyday life situation of receiving a request when you are too busy to donate now).   
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3. Study One Experimental Design and Procedures. 
The experiment took place in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory 
(NZEEL) at the University of Canterbury, with 246 undergraduate students serving as 
subjects. The participants were selected randomly from the NZEEL database using the 
ORSEE recruitment system (Greiner, 2004). The sessions were advertised as a ‘Life as a 
Student’ survey for which the participants would receive $20, followed by a short decision-
making task.7 We advertised that a session might take up to one hour, however, each session 
lasted only 35-40 minutes. As discussed previously, this was to ensure that in some treat-
ments subjects would have sufficient time to drop off their donations in a different location 
on campus before attending other activities they might have scheduled right after the 
experiment.  
Upon entering the laboratory all participants were seated at cubicles. After reading through 
the survey instructions, we handed out the survey forms in large manila envelopes. The 
subjects were given 10 minutes to complete the survey, after which they were asked to place 
the forms back into the manila envelope to protect their anonymity.8 Since we were not 
interested in analyzing survey responses, and wanted to create a perception of the highest 
level of anonymity, the survey forms were not marked in any way.  
After the completed surveys were collected in, we handed out instructions for the decision-
making task. The instructions informed the subjects that we were going to hand out white 
envelopes containing their $20 payment for filling out the survey. We asked the subjects to 
open the envelope and confirm it contained $20, since we needed them to sign a receipt for 
accounting purposes before they left the lab. Subjects were then given an opportunity to 
donate some, or all, of their $20 payment to World Vision New Zealand, who are a registered 
charity doing development work in poor countries overseas.9 We informed them that any 
money they chose to donate would be matched by us dollar for dollar and we would forward 
all money directly to World Vision. The white envelope contained a $10 note, a $5 note, two 
$2 coins and a $1 coin, so it was possible to donate any whole dollar amount, between $0 and 
                                                            
7. The adult minimum wage in New Zealand at the time of the experiment was NZ$13.75 per 
hour. NZ$1 = US$0.82 at the time of the experiment. 
8. The survey questions are provided in the appendix. 
9. We did not provide any other information about the charity. Note, however, that World 
Vision is a very well-known charity in New Zealand, especially among younger people as 
many secondary schools participate in World Vision’s annual 40-hour famine. 
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$20. We reminded the subjects that they were under no obligation to donate any money 
unless they wished to do so.  
Subjects randomly selected a blue envelope from a box carried around the lab by one of the 
experimenters. The envelope contained a blue form with a space to indicate how much 
money, if any, the subjects wished to give to World Vision, and how much money this meant 
World Vision would receive once we matched their donation dollar for dollar. Requiring 
subjects to write down both the amount of their donation, and how much World Vision would 
receive, enabled us to verify that subjects understood the nature of the matching subsidy. We 
explained that for audit reasons we would only be able to match any donation they made if 
we had a written record of what had been donated, hence the need to complete the blue 
donation form. The matching subsidy was particularly important, as we wanted to create an 
incentive for participants to give us the money to pass on to the charity, rather than them 
sending it to the charity themselves, or donating to a different charity following the 
experiment. The way the actual donations were made, including when the blue transfer form 
was completed, varied across treatments and is described below.   
The experiment was run under a double-blind social distance protocol to make subject 
decisions completely anonymous and thus constant across treatments. This was crucial since 
we wanted to ensure that the subjects did not perceive their decisions to be more anonymous 
in treatments where donations were dropped in a box in a different location on the university 
campus, as opposed to in a box right outside the lab. Neither subjects’ names nor their student 
ID numbers appeared on any form that recorded their decisions. The only identifying mark was 
an alpha-numeric code on the donation forms and envelopes. We explained to participants that 
since they randomly picked an envelope from a box, we had no way of knowing who had been 
assigned which code. In an attempt to minimize the chances that the subjects’ donation 
decisions would be influenced by their peers at the end of the session we asked the subjects 
one at a time to come up to a room at the back of the laboratory and sign a receipt for $20 for 
completing the survey. This ensured that they left the lab at 30-40 second intervals. We asked 
them not to wait around outside the lab, and checked to make sure that they did not. 
In order to analyze the effects of transaction costs and inertia on charitable giving we 
implemented four different treatments, using an across-subjects design. What varied across 
the different treatments was when and where any donation was made. In Baseline (B) 
participants placed their donation, and the blue transfer form, in the blue envelope and placed 
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the envelope in a box outside the laboratory immediately following the experimental session. 
Subjects were told to put any money they had chosen to keep in their pocket or bag. Subjects 
who did not wish to make a donation also put the blue envelope in the box, but without any 
money, which kept anonymous whether subjects made a donation or not. Making a donation 
at the time of the experiment is the standard procedure in Dictator Games with a charity 
acting as the recipient. In this treatment there is no transaction cost and no possibility for 
inertia, which allows us to nest our further treatments.  
In the One Hour (1H) treatment, participants wishing to make a donation had to place the 
blue envelope, containing their donation and the blue donation form, in a secure box else-
where on the university campus, and had one hour (following the advertised completion time 
of the survey) to do so. The walking time from the lab to the donation box is approximately 5 
minutes. The laboratory is located on the outskirts of the campus, with the box being located 
in a more central part of the campus. Hence for subjects planning on walking back towards 
the centre of the campus following the experimental session, the marginal amount of time to 
walk to the box would be less than 5 minutes, and for participants planning on heading in the 
opposite direction following the session it would be more than 5 minutes. Hence, the nominal 
transaction cost might vary across participants. This is also true in everyday life where some 
participants will write a check and post it, others will pay online, and for those paying online 
internet speeds may differ.10 In order to ensure that the secure box was easy to find, particip-
ants in 1H, and all subsequent treatments, were provided with a map showing the location of 
the box. On the map we included the time by which they needed to make a donation, if they 
wished to do so. In this (and also in the next) treatment, subjects were asked to open the blue 
                                                            
10. Depending on how much marginal time subjects took to make donations, the transaction 
cost in our laboratory experiment may be slightly higher than the time taken to make a 
donation in everyday life. However, the difference does not seem to be that great. To 
check this, we made a small number of donations to charities online, and noted the 
amount of time this took. Each donation was in response to an email (or having already 
looked up the charity’s web site) so making the donation only required clicking on a link 
in an email, then entering credit card details and any other information requested by the 
charity. In each case, we had a credit card already at hand. The shortest time taken to 
make a donation was 1.5 minutes, with the longest being 3.5 minutes. The average time 
taken to donate was 2.25 minutes. In one case, not included in these summary statistics as 
it was an unusual case, making the donation took approximately 10 minutes as when the 
researcher visited a website he had previously registered for, he had to change the expiry 
date on his credit card. It took some time to figure out how to do this. 
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envelope, while in the lab, and check that it contained the transfer form and map, but were 
asked not to fill in the transfer form until they had left the lab.11  
The 1H treatment introduces a transaction cost: the time taken to walk to the donation box.12 
As participants had been told the experimental session would take up to 60 minutes, and the 
last participant left within 35-40 minutes, we know that participants had plenty of time to 
walk to the box before the 60 minutes of planned lab time was up. In other words, the 
nominal transaction cost was being incurred during time for which all subjects should have 
had no previous plans. This is not to say the opportunity cost of walking to the box was zero, 
as they could, when leaving the lab, choose to do something else with the time, but the 
opportunity cost would not likely be high.  
The potential for inertia is extremely low in the 1H treatment as there is very little scope for 
postponing making a donation. The only possible source of inertia would be for someone to 
decide to make a donation in 60 minutes time, rather than immediately after leaving the lab, 
and then not get around to doing so. Hence, we interpret any difference between B and 1H as 
being due to transaction costs. 
Our One Day (1D) treatment is identical to 1H, except that subjects were given 25 hours to 
make a donation. This treatment includes the transaction cost and, as making a donation can 
be delayed until the following day, this treatment introduces potential for inertia. That is, 
subjects could postpone making their donation until the next day, but then not actually 
donate. This treatment enables us to observe, by clearing the box at regular intervals, the 
proportion of people who choose to make their donation promptly following the laboratory 
session. 
                                                            
11. Subjects were told that if they needed a pen to fill in the form, after leaving the lab, to feel 
free to take the pen we had given them to complete the survey. 
12. Note that there are alternative ways of introducing a transaction cost in our design, for 
example by having subjects who wish to donate fill out a long transfer form. However, 
while filling in a lengthy form requires some effort, if the form was filled in during lab 
time and the choice is between filling in the form and sitting doing nothing, subjects 
would likely not consider that filling in the form involved a significant cost. Alternatively, 
letting those who chose not to donate to leave the laboratory, while others are filling in the 
transfer form, would compromise the double-blind protocol. Finally, since we are also 
testing for inertia, we have to allow subjects to make their donation at a later time, 
meaning they will incur the opportunity cost of time of walking to the box anyway, so 
having the opportunity cost of walking to the box is unavoidable. 
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In our first two treatments (1D and 1H), subjects were able to make their donation immedi-
ately upon leaving the laboratory, during planned lab time. As discussed previously, this is 
analogous to receiving a request from a charity when you have time on your hands to donate 
immediately (when your opportunity cost of time is low). To simulate the everyday life situa-
tion where a request is received at a time when the opportunity cost of time is high, our Next 
Day (ND) treatment only allowed for donations to be made (in the same box located else-
where on campus) between 8am and 5pm the following day.13 This represents a higher effect-
ive transaction cost compared to the other treatments, as subjects do not have the option of 
making the donation in planned lab time.14, 15 By not allowing donations until the following 
day, this treatment also allows for inertia, in the sense that participants might intend to donate 
the following day, but not get around to doing so. In fact, as we ruled out donating immedi-
ately, the potential for inertia is higher than in any of our previous treatments. 
The different experimental treatments are summarized in Table One. There is no transaction 
cost or inertia in the Baseline. 1H introduces a nominal transaction cost but no inertia, with 
1D including both a nominal transaction cost and inertia. In both 1H and 1D the donation can 
be made during planned lab time, so the opportunity cost of time is low, at the time the 
solicitation is received. ND has both a nominal transaction cost and inertia, but the donation 
cannot be made in planned lab time, or even the same day, representing a high opportunity 
cost of time. As the effective transaction cost depends both on whether there is a nominal 
transaction cost and whether the donation can be made during planned lab time, the effective 
transaction cost is highest in ND. The potential for inertia is also highest in ND.  
 
                                                            
13. Outside of these times the building, where the secure box was located, is locked, so is not 
accessible to undergraduate students. This time restriction was announced to participants 
in all treatments where it was relevant. 
14. An alternative way of creating a high opportunity cost of time would have been to have a 
treatment where subjects remained in the lab for the full hour the session was advertised 
for. However, we would not have known whether subjects were busy or not when they 
left the lab. If subjects were not busy when they left the lab after an hour, this treatment 
would actually be very similar to 1D. The ND treatment, by contrast, imposes an infinite 
opportunity cost of time when the solicitation is made, giving a clean comparison with 
1D, where we knew the opportunity cost of time was low.  
15. Note that subjects were told not to open the blue envelope containing the transfer form 
until they had left the lab. However, they were shown a copy of the map, which noted the 
time a donation could be made, and the transfer form did not include any information that 
was not included in the written instructions.   
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Table 1. 
 Summary of Experimental Treatments. 
 
Nominal 
Transaction 
Cost 
Opportunity 
Cost of Time 
(when request is 
received) 
Effective 
Transaction 
Cost 
Inertia 
 
Baseline Zero n/a Zero Zero 
1H Yes Low Yes Extremely Low 
1D Yes Low Yes Yes 
ND Yes Infinite Yes; higher than 
1D and IH 
Yes; higher than 
1D and 1H 
 
Our conjectures and testable hypotheses can be summarized as follows. 
Conjecture 1: introducing a transaction cost (but still requiring donations to be made 
promptly ruling out inertia) will reduce donations.  
Hypothesis 1: 1H < B (and all other treatments). 
 
Conjecture 2: giving more time to donate, when the opportunity cost of time is low, will not 
introduce inertia and therefore not reduce donations.  
Hypothesis 2: 1H = 1D 
Hypothesis 2 tests the effect of giving subjects more time to donate, but keeping the 
opportunity cost of time low when the request is received. While giving more time to donate 
could potentially introduce inertia (condition 1 presented in the introduction), condition 2, 
which specifies that inertia requires high opportunity cost of time, is not satisfied. Since we 
conjecture that both conditions have to be satisfied simultaneously in order for inertia to be 
found, we not expect to observe a difference between 1H and 1D. 
 
Conjecture 3: The potential for inertia, and the effective transaction cost, will be higher if 
the request is received at a time when the opportunity cost of time is high (and in the presence 
of transaction costs).  
Hypothesis 3: ND < 1D 
Hypothesis 3 tests the effect of giving people more time to donate (hence introducing inertia) 
but ruling out donating immediately (i.e. the opportunity cost of time is infinite when the 
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request is received). Lower donations in ND could be due to the higher effective transaction 
cost (which is due to the higher opportunity cost of time) or to the higher potential for inertia. 
 
Conjecture 4: If the opportunity cost of time is low when the request is received, we would 
expect most subjects who choose to donate to do so promptly minimizing the potential for 
inertia.  
Hypothesis 4: in 1D the majority of donations will be made promptly. 
Hypothesis 4 tests whether people will tend to donate promptly if, at the time the solicitation 
is received, their opportunity cost of time is low.  
 
 
4. Study One Results. 
Summary statistics for each treatment are reported in Table 2, with Figure 1 depicting the 
results graphically. The modal donation in all treatments is to give nothing. The mean 
donation in B is $2.48 (12.4% of the subjects’ endowment),16 with over half (58%) of 
subjects giving a positive amount of money to the charity.17 Donations are higher in B than in 
any of the treatments, and a casual inspection of Figure 1 suggests this may be due in large 
part to the lower number of small donations (those between $1 and $4) made in the various 
treatments compared to in B. This is consistent with average donations, conditional on 
making a donation, being lowest in B. 
 
 
                                                            
16. Our mean donation of 12% in Baseline is lower than in some other Dictator Games where 
the recipient is a charity, but is the same as in Reinstein and Reiner’s (2012) performance/ 
cash treatment. Like our Baseline treatment, in their performance/cash treatment there is a 
double-blind protocol, subjects were not paid a show-up fee, they had to earn their endow 
ments and were paid prior to making a decision as to how much to donate. However, one 
difference between our study and Reinstein and Reiner’s is that we include a matching 
subsidy. 
17. Recall that subjects were paid a $10 note, a $5 note, two $2 coins and a $1 coin. It is, 
therefore, tempting to expect a significant number of $5 donations, from those happy to 
get rid of the coins, but wanting to keep the notes. However, across the different treat-
ments there were three people who gave $5, one who gave $10 and one who gave $15, 
who donated the notes and kept the coins. By contrast, in the ND treatment, there were 
two subjects who used the opportunity to put some of their own loose change (coins 
smaller than $1) in the envelope, and keep the larger denomination coins and the notes, 
which we had paid them, for themselves. 
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Table 2: 
Summary Statistics for Study One. 
Treatment Baseline 
(B) 
One 
Hour 
(1H) 
One Day 
(1D) 
Next Day 
(ND) 
Panel A: All Data 
Number of observations  60 58 61 67 
Average donation 2.48 1.43 1.72 1.20 
Median donation 2 0 0 0 
Standard deviation 3.52 3.41 5.33 4.37 
Panel B: Intensive Margin 
Number of positive 
donations 
35 
(58.3%) 
14 
(24.1%) 
 14 
(23.0%) 
7 
(10.4%) 
Average donation 
conditional on giving 
4.26 5.93 7.50 11.36 
Median donation 
conditional on giving 
3 5 5 10 
Standard deviation 
conditional on giving 
3.71 4.73 6.28 8.49 
 
 
Figure 1:  
Frequency of Different Levels of Donations. 
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Table 3 provides more detail on the proportions of total donations in each treatment 
accounted for by small ($1-$4) and large ($5 or greater) donations. In B, 33% of subjects 
donate between $1 and $4, but this falls to single figure percentages in all the treatments.18 Of 
the $2.48 average donation in B, $0.68 of this is made up of small donations, with the 
remaining $1.80 made up of large donations. The proportion of small donations is much 
lower in all remaining treatments. 
 
Table 3: 
Small and Large Donations 
Treatment Baseline 
(B) 
One Hour 
(1H) 
One Day 
(1D) 
Next Day 
(ND) 
 
Number of observations (N) 60 58 61 67 
Number of small donations 
($1-$4) 
20 
(33.3%) 
3 
(5.2%) 
4 
(6.6%) 
2 
(3.0%) 
$ value of small donations 41 6 10 4.50 
$ value of small donations / N 0.68 0.10 0.16 0.07 
Number of large donations 
($5 or more) 
15 
(25.0%) 
11 
(19.0%) 
10 
(16.4%) 
5 
(7.5%) 
$ value of large donations 108 77 95 75 
$ value of large donations / N 1.80 1.32 1.56 1.12 
Average donation 2.48 1.43 1.72 1.20 
 
 
Table 4 presents formal statistical tests for whether the differences across treatments are 
statistically significant. We report standard t-tests for the difference between means, but as 
the data are not normally distributed we focus more on the results for a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test of the null hypothesis that the two distributions are identical. We 
also report Fisher’s Exact Test for the proportion of positive donations, to test if the number 
of positive donations is statistically significantly different across treatments. The only 
pairwise comparison of treatments where the differences are not statistically significant is 
between 1H and 1D. For the intensive margin, the average donation conditional on donating 
is statistically significantly lower in B compared to all other treatments, but none of the other 
pairwise comparisons are statistically significant (which is likely due to the small number of 
positive donations in many of these treatments). 
                                                            
18. Fisher’s Exact Test reports a significant difference in the proportion of small and large 
donations between B and all the other treatments (p=0.000 in all three cases.) 
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Table 4: 
Significance Tests for Differences across Treatments 
Data Means t-test Wilcoxon Rank-
Sum Test 
Fisher’s Exact Test 
for Proportion of 
Positive Donations 
Panel A: Mean Donations (All Data) 
B vs. 1H 1.65 (0.102) -3.15 (0.002) (0.000) 
B vs. 1D 1.06 (0.290) -3.25 (0.001) (0.000) 
B vs. ND 1.86 (0.066) -5.20 (0.000) (0.000) 
1H vs. 1D -0.41 (0.684) -0.10 (0.920) (1.000) 
1H v ND 0.35 (0.725) -1.91 (0.056) (0.055) 
1D v ND 0.70 (0.487) -1.82 (0.070) (0.093) 
Panel B: Intensive Margin (Mean Donation Conditional on Donating) 
B vs. 1H -1.18 (0.250) 1.673 (0.094)  
B vs. 1D -1.81 (0.089) 2.079 (0.038)  
B vs. ND -2.17 (0.070) 2.154 (0.031)  
1H vs. 1D -0.74 (0.462) 0.350 (0.726)  
1H v ND -1.57 (0.155) 1.149 (0.250)  
1D v ND -1.07 (0.313) 0.805 (0.421)  
Note: All reported tests are 2-sided. 
 
 
Our four key results are summarized below. 
Result 1 (based on hypothesis 1): Transaction costs reduce donations. 
Support for Result 1: Introducing a relatively small nominal transaction cost (requiring 
subjects to take a short walk in order to make a donation), but without introducing any 
possibility for inertia, reduced average donations from $2.48 in the baseline to $1.43 in 1H. 
This difference, which is significantly different (p-value = 0.002), represents a decrease in 
donations of 42 percent. The Fisher’s Exact Test, reported in the first three rows of Table 4, 
suggests there are significantly (p-value = 0.000) more positive donations in B than in any of 
the treatments. A large part of this reduction in donations is due to fewer small donations (in 
the $1-$4 range) being made once a transaction cost has been introduced.  
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Result 2 (based on hypothesis 2): There is no evidence of inertia when the request is received 
at a time when the opportunity cost of time is low. 
Support for Result 2: All three tests reported in the fourth row of Table 4 find no statistically 
significant difference in giving between 1H and 1D. Failing to find a significant difference 
between these treatments is consistent with our conjecture that inertia is less likely to exist if 
the solicitation is received at a time when the opportunity cost of time is low. However, 
another possibility, which we cannot rule out, is that there may be subjects for whom the 
nominal transaction cost is lower in 1D if they have a class near the box the following day. If 
this is the case, then this would mean the effective transaction cost is lower in 1D, but the 
potential for inertia higher, with the two effects potentially cancelling out. 
 
Result 3 (based on hypothesis 3): Nominal transaction costs have a bigger impact when the 
solicitation is received at a time when the donation cannot be made immediately.  
Support for Result 3: Average donations fall from $1.72 in 1D (where the donation can be 
made immediately, at a time when the opportunity cost of time is known to be low, or at any 
other time in the following 25 hours) to $1.20 in ND (where the donation cannot be made 
until the next day). This difference is significantly different (p-value = 0.070) and represents 
a reduction in donations of 30 percent. There is a significantly higher proportion of positive 
donations in 1D than in ND (p-value = 0.093).  
There are two possible reasons for why nominal transaction costs have a bigger impact when 
the donation request is received at a time when the donation cannot be made immediately. 
The first is that the transaction cost is higher (as the opportunity cost of time is higher) and 
the second is that delaying making the donation introduces the potential for inertia (“I do not 
have to make a donation now, so will do so tomorrow”). As our experiment was not designed 
to distinguish between these explanations, we leave this issue for future research. Note, 
however, that from a policy perspective, the important point is that donations are lower, if the 
solicitation is received when the potential donor’s opportunity cost of time is high. 
 
 
Result 4 (based on hypothesis 4): Given the option of donating promptly or delaying 
payment most subjects choose to donate promptly.  
Support for Result 4: As we discretely cleared the box at regular intervals, our design enabled 
us to observe what proportion of participants chose to donate promptly, when we knew their 
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opportunity cost of time was low, rather than delay making the donation until the following 
day. In 1D subjects could make their donation any time in the 25 hours following the 
experiment. One interesting result from this treatment is that of the 14 subjects who gave a 
positive amount, 12 did so that day, with only 2 making a donation the following day. Of the 
two people donating the following day, one donated the full $20 and the other donated $10. 
This is an important result, as it is provides some confirmation that subjects really did 
perceive the opportunity cost of their time to be low immediately following the lab session, 
giving us confidence that our method for controlling the opportunity cost of time, at the time 
of the solicitation, is valid.  
 
Implications of Study One Results. 
Our results from Study One suggest a number of important findings with policy implications 
for charities. The first is that introducing a transaction cost reduces donations, but this comes 
about largely as a result of transaction costs reducing the number of smaller donations. If the 
charity receiving the money also faces a transaction cost in processing donations, this 
reduction in smaller donations may not be a bad thing from the charity’s perspective. 
However, if there is a very low marginal transaction cost faced by the charity, lowering the 
transaction cost for the donor would be desirable. One example of a fund raising effort with 
low transaction costs for both the donor and charity is street collections where volunteers 
stand on the street with a container asking passers-by for a donation. Another example is 
charities advertising that if a text message is sent to a certain number, that a specified 
donation will be made to the charity and the amount be automatically added to the donor’s 
phone bill. Taking our results at face value would suggest such fund raising mechanisms are a 
good way of targeting those who would be happy to make a small donation, but would be put 
off by even a small transaction cost. Smith (2012) reports that $43 million was raised in the 
US in response to the Haiti earthquake, as a result of advertisements encouraging people to 
send a text message to make a $10 donation. Based on a survey of a sample of those who 
donated, Smith finds that 50% donated immediately upon learning about the campaign, with 
an additional 23% donating on the same day. This is consistent with donating promptly in 
response to low transaction costs. Increased use of the push-pay app, which is available for 
use on smart phones, would also greatly reduce transaction costs, as the web site for the app 
claims that, once registered, users can make payments in only ten seconds. Our results would 
suggest this should increase donations to charity. 
23 
 
Our results also suggest that donations will be higher if people receive a request from a 
charity at a time when their opportunity cost of time is low. This has important implications 
for charities as it implies donations will be higher if they can catch potential donors when 
they have time on their hands to donate, if they choose to do so. Perhaps street collectors 
could position themselves near bus stops, and other places where people with time on their 
hands are likely to be congregating. Our results also have some welfare implications. We 
assume that the people who gave in the baseline did so because this increased their utility, 
either due to a warm glow from giving, or because they derive utility from the consumption 
of others (in this case the people overseas who benefit from the work of World Vision). It 
follows that making it easier for people to donate (by reducing transaction costs and soliciting 
people when their opportunity cost of time is low) will be welfare improving. 
 
 
5.  Study Two Experimental Design and Procedures. 
Study Two introduces a treatment which gives subjects one week to make a donation, starting 
at 8am the day following the experimental session. We refer to this treatment as the Next Day 
all Week (NDW-2)19 treatment. Comparing the ND-2 with NDW-2 treatments enables us to 
test whether giving subjects more time to donate reduces donations. As the effective 
transaction cost can be no higher in NDW-2 than in ND-2 (as the options for when to donate 
in ND-2 are a subset of those in NDW-2) finding a lower level of donations in NDW-2 would 
be evidence of an inertia effect.  
As mentioned earlier, the low level of donations in the ND treatment in Study One raised the 
concern that it would be difficult to observe a statistically significant difference between the 
ND and NDW treatments, hence we did not run the NDW treatment in Study One. In Study 
Two, conducted three months after Study One at NZEEL with new subjects, we changed the 
experimental design in two key ways in an attempt to increase average donations for both the 
ND-2 and NDW-2 treatments. Comparing ND-2 with NDW-2 tests for the presence of an 
inertia effect, when the solicitation is received at a time when the opportunity cost of time is 
high. Hence, the key focus of Study Two is to analyze whether giving subjects more time to 
donate reduces donations, if the opportunity cost of time is high at the time of the solicitation. 
                                                            
19. “-2” indicates that Study Two procedures were used. 
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The first change to the experimental design was to give subjects their endowment as a 
windfall gain, rather than getting them to earn it. The lab session was advertised as being a 
decision-making task lasting 30 minutes, for which subjects would be paid a $10 show-up 
fee. Having been paid their show-up fee, participants were given an additional payment of 
$10 and invited to donate some or all of the additional payment (which was paid to them as 
one $5 note, two $2 coins and one $1 coin) to World Vision. Hence, the additional $10 
represented a windfall gain. A number of studies find that subjects will be more generous in 
Dictator Games if their endowment is a windfall gain (see, for example, Cherry, Frykblom 
and Shogren 2002; Cherry and Shogren, 2008; Reinstein and Reiner, 2012; Carlsson, He and 
Martinsson, 2013). The second change to the experimental design was to tell participants 
what World Vision would spend the money on. In Study One they were simply told the 
money would go to World Vision; in Study Two subjects were told that World Vision would 
spend donations “to provide vaccinations to protect children in poor countries (e.g. in African 
countries like Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) against measles, whooping cough, diphtheria, 
hepatitis, polio and tetanus” and that “these diseases cause many children to die every year, 
but are easily preventable.” Brañas-Garza (2006) finds that providing subjects with 
information on what donations would be spent on increased donations. With the exception of 
these two changes, the experimental design was the same as in Study One (the Study Two 
instructions are included as Appendix 3). Subjects in the ND-2 treatment were able to make 
donations the following day between 8am and 5pm, with subjects in the NDW-2 treatment 
being able to make a donation any weekday between 8am and 5pm starting the next day for 
the following week. 
Our conjecture and hypothesis for Study Two are presented below. 
Conjecture 5: giving subjects more time to donate will reduce donations. If donations are 
lower in NDW-2 this will provide evidence of an inertia effect. 
Hypothesis 5: ND-2 > NDW-2 
Note, however, that in the absence of an inertia effect, donations could be higher in NDW-2 
due to a lower effective transaction cost. Hence, failing to find a significant difference 
between NDW-2 and ND-2 does not necessarily mean there is no inertia effect as there could 
be both an inertia effect and a transaction cost effect, but with the two cancelling out.  
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6.  Study Two Results. 
Summary statistics for the two treatments are reported in Table 5, with the distribution of 
donations being shown in Figure 2.20 The first point to note is that donations are higher in the 
ND-2 treatment in Study Two (mean donation = $2.24) than for the ND treatment in Study 
One (mean donation = $1.20), meaning that the change in procedures successfully increased 
donations. Note from Figure 2 that for subjects choosing to make a donation, many gave the 
full $10. Our key focus is on comparing the ND-2 and NDW-2 treatments. Both the number 
of positive donations and the mean donation are higher in ND-2, which is consistent with an 
inertia effect. However, these differences are not statistically significant. The t-test for the 
differences between means has a p-value of 0.672, the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test a p-value of 
0.565 and the Fisher’s Exact Test for the proportion of positive donations a p-value of 0.500. 
The differences between donations across treatments on the intensive margin are also 
statistically insignificant: the respective t-test and the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test p-values are 
0.500 and 0.809. In summary, we find some suggestive evidence of an inertia effect, but this 
is not statistically significant.  
Result 5: There is no statistically significant evidence of inertia when the request is received 
at a time when the opportunity cost of time is high. 
 
Table 5: 
Summary Statistics for Study Two 
Treatment Next Day (ND-2) Next Day all Week (NDW-2) 
Panel A: All Data 
Number of observations 82 87 
Average donation 2.24 2.00 
Median donation 0 0 
Standard deviation 3.83 3.64 
Panel B: Intensive Margin 
Number of positive donations 26  (31.7%) 23  (26.4%) 
Average donation conditional on giving 7.07 7.57 
Median donation conditional on giving 10 10 
Stand. deviation conditional on giving 3.44 2.79 
                                                            
20. One subject in the ND treatment donated the full $20. As the instructions only asked sub-
jects to give a maximum of $10, we treat this as a $10 donation for the purpose of report-
ing results. The full $20, along with a matching subsidy of $20, was forwarded to the 
charity. 
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Also of interest is how promptly people donated in the NDW-2 treatment. Of the twenty-three 
subjects who made a donation, thirteen donated on Day 1 (i.e. the day following the experi-
mental session), three on Day 2, two on Day 3, one on Day 4 and five on Day 5. Hence, the 
majority of people donated on the first possible day, with the next most common response 
being to leave donating till the last possible day. It is possible that some of those who donated 
on the last day were prompted to do so by the looming deadline, and that they would not have 
donated if there had been no specified deadline for donations. 
 
 
Figure 2: 
 Frequency of Different Levels of Donations, Study Two 
  
 
Implications of Study Two Results. 
We find donations are higher in ND-2, but this difference is not statistically significant. This 
does not mean there is no inertia effect, as it could be that any inertia effect is cancelled out 
by the effective transaction cost being lower in NDW-2. However, from a policy perspective, 
the important question is whether giving people more time to donate reduces donations, and 
we do not find statistically significant evidence that this is the case. It could be that the time 
horizon we considered was not long enough to detect inertia. One could hypothesize that if 
we had added a treatment where subjects had been given a month to donate, or if we included 
a treatment with no specific deadline, evidence of an inertia effect might have emerged. 
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However, since it is not clear how long time horizon is required to induce inertia, we leave 
these explorations for future research.  
 
 
7.  Conclusion. 
This paper has analyzed three separate but closely related questions with respect to charitable 
giving. To what extent do transaction costs reduce charitable giving? Does this depend on 
how busy potential donors are when the solicitation is received? Do people suffer from inertia 
with respect to charitable giving? We analyze these three questions using a Dictator Game 
experiment where the recipient is a charity. A transaction cost is introduced by having 
subjects who wish to donate place their donation in a secure box located a short walk away. 
This transaction cost significantly reduces donations, especially small donations, compared to 
a baseline with no transaction cost. We control for the opportunity cost of time, at the time of 
the solicitation, by giving some subjects the opportunity of walking to the donation box 
during time they planned to be taking part in the experiment, whereas other subjects do not 
have this option. We find that donations are lower when the opportunity cost of time is high 
at the time of the solicitation. We test for inertia by giving some subjects longer to donate 
than others. In Study One, consistent with our hypothesis, there is no evidence of inertia 
when the opportunity cost of time is low at the time of the solicitation. In Study Two, we find 
some evidence that giving subjects longer to donate reduces donations, but this difference is 
not statistically significant. This does not mean that there is no inertia effect, as it could be 
that  inertia is cancelled out by the effective transaction cost being lower when subjects are 
given more time to donate. However, from a policy perspective, the important question is 
whether giving people more time to donate reduces donations and we fail to find statistically 
significant evidence that this is the case. 
Our results have two important policy implications. The first is that charities should use 
solicitation techniques which minimize transaction costs for potential donors, especially if the 
charity finds it valuable to receive small donations. Encouraging more use of the push pay 
app, and text messaging as a means of making donations, are examples of how transaction 
costs can be minimized. Our second key policy implication is that it is important to solicit 
donations when people are likely to not be too busy. Street collections would be an example 
where the transaction costs are low. While passers-by might be too busy to donate, people 
waiting at a bus stop are likely not.   
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APPENDICES: FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
Appendix 1: Survey Completed by Subjects in Study One 
Survey: Life as a Student  
This survey asks questions about yourself, some questions about student life and some 
general knowledge questions about the University and Christchurch. Your responses to the 
questions will be completely anonymous. No one, including the researchers, will ever know 
which individuals gave which answers. 
Some questions about yourself  
 
1. Gender: Male  ◯              Female  ◯    
 
2. Intended major subject (if known) __________________ 
 
3. Are you an active member of any voluntary organisation or club (e.g., sports, craft, 
social club)?   Yes  ◯            No  ◯    
If yes, specify what sort of organisation/club _______________________ 
 
4. How frequently do you take part in organised religious activities? 
once a week or more  ◯  less than once a week but more than once a month  ◯    
once a month or less  ◯     never or almost never  ◯ 
 
5. How often do you follow news from around the world (e.g., through television, the 
internet or newspapers)?                     
most days  ◯    2-3 times a week  ◯     
once a week ◯   less than once a week  ◯ 
 
6. How often do you follow news from New Zealand (e.g., through television, the 
internet or newspapers)?                     
 most days  ◯    2-3 times a week  ◯     
 once a week ◯   less than once a week  ◯ 
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7. If you do follow news, from around the world or from New Zealand, which media do 
you use the most often? 
internet  ◯   television  ◯  newspaper  ◯  other  ◯    
don’t follow world news  ◯   
 
8. How often do you watch sport on television? 
several times a week  ◯     once or twice a week  ◯     
between once a week and once a month ◯   never   ◯ 
 
9. If you do watch sport on television, which sports do you watch 
___________________________________________________   
     
10. In an average week, how many nights do you spend out at a bar, club, restaurant or 
cinema? 
6-7  ◯   3-5  ◯    1-2  ◯   zero  ◯  
 
Some questions about student life and the University of Canterbury 
 
11. What is the main reason you chose to study at Canterbury rather than at another 
university? 
Academic reputation of Canterbury  ◯    Social life at Canterbury  ◯   
Family/friends in Christchurch  ◯     Other  ◯   
If other, please specify ______________________________________ 
 
12. For how many years are you planning on studying at Canterbury? 
1  ◯    2  ◯     3  ◯    4 or more  ◯   
 
13. Where do you live? 
Hall of residence  ◯   Private flat  ◯   
Family home  ◯    Other  ◯   
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14. Do you have a student loan? 
Yes  ◯   No  ◯   
 
15. Do your parents contribute to your fees or living expenses? 
Yes  ◯   No  ◯   
 
16.  Who is the current Vice Chancellor of the University of Canterbury? 
________________________ 
 
17. In what year did the University of Canterbury open? ___________ 
 
 
Some general knowledge questions about Christchurch and the surrounding area: 
18.  Who is the current mayor of Christchurch? __________________ 
 
19.  The city of Christchurch is named after a college at which English university? 
___________________ 
 
20. In December 1850, 4 ships carrying settlers from England arrived in Lyttelton . Name 
one of the ships. _____________________________ 
 
21. Who is the current coach of the Crusaders? ________________ 
 
22. In the 2006 census, the percentage of people living in Christchurch who listed their 
ethnicity as European was: 
95%  ◯   85%  ◯    75%   ◯  65%  ◯   
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Appendix 2:  Study One Instructions 
[The survey instructions shown below were identical across all treatments in Study One.] 
Instructions: Survey 
Thank you for participating in this research project. As well as completing a survey, we will 
also get you to take part in a short decision-making task. This should take no longer than 1 
hour. 
Survey 
The survey form is in a manila envelope which we will now hand out to you. You may start 
filling in the survey once it is handed to you, and we will give you ten minutes to complete 
this. Your anonymity is guaranteed as you have not been asked to write your name or ID 
number on the survey. We will get you to place your completed survey in the manila 
envelope when you hand it back in, so we cannot see your answers. Please do not leave when 
you finish the survey as we still have the decision-making task to conduct. 
 
[The decision-making task instructions shown below are those used in Baseline.] 
Instructions: Decision-making task 
White envelope 
We are going to hand out a white envelope containing your $20 payment for filling out the 
survey. Please open the envelope and confirm it contains $20. We will get you to sign a 
receipt for this before you leave. 
Decision-making task 
We are now going to undertake the second part of this session. We ask that you listen quietly 
to the following instructions and do not speak until you have left the room. 
Donation 
We would now like to give you the opportunity, if you wish, to donate some, or all, of your 
$20 payment to World Vision New Zealand, who are a registered charity doing development 
work in poor countries overseas. Any money you choose to donate to World Vision will be 
matched by us dollar for dollar (in other words, we will double your donation) and we will 
forward all money directly to World Vision. The white envelope you opened earlier contains 
a $10 note, a $5 note, two $2 coins and a $1 coin, so it is possible to donate any whole dollar 
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amount, between $0 and $20 to World Vision. You are under no obligation to donate any 
money to World Vision unless you wish to do so.  
Anonymity 
Your decision is completely anonymous. This task is designed in such a way that no-one will 
ever know how much any individual has given. Your privacy is guaranteed because neither 
your name nor your student ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions. The 
only identifying mark in all records will be the alpha-numeric code on your form and envelopes. 
We have no way of knowing who has been assigned which code. We will shortly invite you to 
put any money you wish to donate in a blue envelope and place this envelope in a box outside 
the lab when you leave. As you are sitting in a cubicle, no-one, including us, can see how 
much money you put in the blue envelope. 
Blue envelope 
We are also going to hand out a blue envelope containing a blue form with a space to indicate 
how much money,  if any, you wish to give to World Vision, and how much money this 
means World Vision will receive once we have matched your donation dollar for dollar. For 
audit reasons, we are only able to match any donation you make dollar for dollar if we have a 
written record of what has been donated, hence the need for you to complete this form. 
Please open the blue envelope and take a few seconds to decide how much, if anything, you 
want to donate to World Vision. Please complete the blue form, and place the form, and any 
money you have chosen to donate, in the blue envelope and seal the envelope. We suggest 
you put any money you have decided to keep in your pocket or bag. We will give you two 
minutes to do this. 
Receipt 
At the end of the session we will ask you one at a time to come up to the room at the back of 
the lab and sign a form acknowledging that you were paid $20 for completing the survey. 
When you have done this, please leave the lab and place the blue envelope, whether you have 
chosen to donate any money or not, in the red box labelled “Economics” sitting outside the 
lab. Please do not wait around outside the lab once you have done this. 
Thank you once more for taking part in our study.  
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[The decision-making task instructions shown below are those used in 1H] 
 
Instructions: Decision-making task 
White envelope 
We are going to hand out a white envelope containing your $20 payment for filling out the 
survey. Please open the envelope and confirm it contains $20. We will get you to sign a 
receipt for this before you leave. 
Decision-making task 
We are now going to undertake the second part of this session. We ask that you listen quietly 
to the following instructions and do not speak until you have left the room. 
Donation 
We would now like to give you the opportunity, if you wish, to donate some, or all, of your 
$20 payment to World Vision New Zealand, who are a registered charity doing development 
work in poor countries overseas. Any money you choose to donate to World Vision will be 
matched by us dollar for dollar (in other words, we will double your donation) and we will 
forward all money directly to World Vision. The white envelope you opened earlier contains 
a $10 note, a $5 note, two $2 coins and a $1 coin, so it is possible to donate any whole dollar 
amount, between $0 and $20 to World Vision. You are under no obligation to donate any 
money to World Vision unless you wish to do so.  
Anonymity 
Your decision is completely anonymous. This task is designed in such a way that no-one will 
ever know how much any individual has given. Your privacy is guaranteed because neither 
your name nor your student ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions. The 
only identifying mark in all records will be the alpha-numeric code on your form and envelopes. 
We have no way of knowing who has been assigned which code. We will shortly invite you to 
put any money you wish to donate in a blue envelope and place this envelope in a box 
labelled “ECON” located on the ground floor in the main entrance of the Psychology building 
(the car park side, not the Cafe 101 side) following this session. You will have until [insert 
time] today to place the envelope in the box if you wish to make a donation. Note that the box 
will be emptied shortly after [insert time] today, so you cannot make a donation after that 
37 
 
time, even if you see the box there. There is a map in the blue envelope showing the location 
of the Psychology Building.  
Blue envelope 
We are also going to hand out a blue envelope containing a blue form with a space to indicate 
how much money,  if any, you wish to give to World Vision, and how much money this 
means World Vision will receive once we have matched your donation dollar for dollar. For 
audit reasons, we are only able to match any donation you make dollar for dollar if we have a 
written record of what has been donated, hence the need for you to complete this form. 
Please open the blue envelope and check that it contains a map and the blue form. However, 
please do not fill in the blue form until you have left the lab. If you need a pen to fill it in, feel 
free to take the one we lent you earlier. Remember if you choose to make a donation, you 
need to place the envelope, containing your donation and the completed blue form, in the red 
box in the Psychology Building by 3pm today. 
Receipt 
At the end of the session we will ask you one at a time to come up to the room at the back of 
the lab and sign a form acknowledging that you were paid $20 for completing the survey. 
When you have done this, please leave the lab and do not wait around outside.  Remember if 
you wish to make a donation you have until [insert time] today to do so. 
Thank you once more for taking part in our study.  
 
[The decision-making task instructions shown below are those used in 1D] 
Instructions: Decision-making task 
White envelope 
We are going to hand out a white envelope containing your $20 payment for filling out the 
survey. Please open the envelope and confirm it contains $20. We will get you to sign a 
receipt for this before you leave. 
Decision-making task 
We are now going to undertake the second part of this session. We ask that you listen quietly 
to the following instructions and do not speak until you have left the room. 
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Donation 
We would now like to give you the opportunity, if you wish, to donate some, or all, of your 
$20 payment to World Vision New Zealand, who are a registered charity doing development 
work in poor countries overseas. Any money you choose to donate to World Vision will be 
matched by us dollar for dollar (in other words, we will double your donation) and we will 
forward all money directly to World Vision. The white envelope contains a $10 note, a $5 
note, two $2 coins and a $1 coin, so it is possible to donate any whole dollar amount, between 
$0 and $20 to World Vision. You are under no obligation to donate any money to World 
Vision unless you wish to do so.  
Anonymity 
Your decision is completely anonymous. This task is designed in such a way that no-one will 
ever know how much any individual has given. Your privacy is guaranteed because neither 
your name nor your student ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions. The 
only identifying mark in all records will be the alpha-numeric code on your form and envelopes. 
We have no way of knowing who has been assigned which code.  
Blue envelope 
We are also going to hand out a blue envelope containing a blue form with a space to indicate 
how much money,  if any, you wish to give to World Vision, and how much money this 
means World Vision will receive once we have matched your donation dollar for dollar. For 
audit reasons, we are only able to match any donation you make dollar for dollar if we have a 
written record of what has been donated, hence the need for you to complete this form. 
Please do not open the blue envelope until you have left the lab. If you wish to make a 
donation put the money you wish to donate in the blue envelope and place this envelope in a 
box labelled “ECON” located on the ground floor in the main entrance of the Psychology 
building (the car park side, not the Cafe 101 side) tomorrow. You will have from 8am until 
5pm tomorrow ([insert day of week and date]) to place the envelope in the box if you wish to 
make a donation. Note that donations will only be matched dollar for dollar if placed in the 
box between 8am and 5pm tomorrow. There is a map in the blue envelope showing the 
location of the Psychology Building.  
Remember if you choose to make a donation, you need to place the envelope, containing your 
donation and the completed blue form, in the red box in the Psychology Building between 
8am and 5pm tomorrow ([insert day of week and date]). 
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Receipt 
At the end of the session we will ask you one at a time to come up to the room at the back of 
the lab and sign a form acknowledging that you were paid $20 for completing the survey. 
When you have done this, please leave the lab and do not wait around outside.  Remember if 
you wish to make a donation you can do this between 8am and 5pm tomorrow. 
Thank you once more for taking part in our study.  
 
[The decision-making task instructions shown below are those used in ND] 
Instructions: Decision-making task 
White envelope 
We are going to hand out a white envelope containing your $20 payment for filling out the 
survey. Please open the envelope and confirm it contains $20. We will get you to sign a 
receipt for this before you leave. 
Decision-making task 
We are now going to undertake the second part of this session. We ask that you listen quietly 
to the following instructions and do not speak until you have left the room. 
Donation 
We would now like to give you the opportunity, if you wish, to donate some, or all, of your 
$20 payment to World Vision New Zealand, who are a registered charity doing development 
work in poor countries overseas. Any money you choose to donate to World Vision will be 
matched by us dollar for dollar (in other words, we will double your donation) and we will 
forward all money directly to World Vision. The white envelope contains a $10 note, a $5 
note, two $2 coins and a $1 coin, so it is possible to donate any whole dollar amount, between 
$0 and $20 to World Vision. You are under no obligation to donate any money to World 
Vision unless you wish to do so.  
Anonymity 
Your decision is completely anonymous. This task is designed in such a way that no-one will 
ever know how much any individual has given. Your privacy is guaranteed because neither 
your name nor your student ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions. The 
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only identifying mark in all records will be the alpha-numeric code on your form and envelopes. 
We have no way of knowing who has been assigned which code.  
Blue envelope 
We are also going to hand out a blue envelope containing a blue form with a space to indicate 
how much money,  if any, you wish to give to World Vision, and how much money this 
means World Vision will receive once we have matched your donation dollar for dollar. For 
audit reasons, we are only able to match any donation you make dollar for dollar if we have a 
written record of what has been donated, hence the need for you to complete this form. 
Please do not open the blue envelope until you have left the lab. If you wish to make a 
donation put the money you wish to donate in the blue envelope and place this envelope in a 
box labelled “ECON” located on the ground floor in the main entrance of the Psychology 
building (the car park side, not the Cafe 101 side) tomorrow. You will have from 8am until 
5pm tomorrow ([insert day of week and date]) to place the envelope in the box if you wish to 
make a donation. Note that donations will only be matched dollar for dollar if placed in the 
box between 8am and 5pm tomorrow. There is a map in the blue envelope showing the 
location of the Psychology Building.  
Remember if you choose to make a donation, you need to place the envelope, containing your 
donation and the completed blue form, in the red box in the Psychology Building between 
8am and 5pm tomorrow ([insert day of week and date]). 
Receipt 
At the end of the session we will ask you one at a time to come up to the room at the back of 
the lab and sign a form acknowledging that you were paid $20 for completing the survey. 
When you have done this, please leave the lab and do not wait around outside.  Remember if 
you wish to make a donation you can do this between 8am and 5pm tomorrow. 
Thank you once more for taking part in our study.
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Appendix Three: Study Two Instructions 
[The instructions below are for ND-2] 
Instructions: Decision-making task 
Thank you for participating in this research project, which should take no longer than 30 
minutes. 
Show up fee 
You have all received your $10 show up fee when you arrived at the lab. We will get you to 
sign a receipt for this before you leave. 
Decision-making task 
We are now going to undertake the decision making task. We ask that you listen quietly to 
the following instructions and do not speak until you have left the lab. If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
Donation 
We will shortly hand out to you a brown envelope containing $10. This money is being given 
to you in addition to your $10 show up fee.  You can either keep this additional $10 for 
yourself, or donate some, or all, of it to World Vision New Zealand, who are a registered 
charity doing development work in poor countries overseas. Any money you choose to 
donate to World Vision will be matched by us dollar for dollar (in other words, we will 
double your donation) and we will forward all money directly to World Vision. World Vision 
will use this money to provide vaccinations to protect children in poor countries (e.g. in 
African countries like Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) against measles, whooping cough, 
diphtheria, hepatitis, polio and tetanus. These diseases cause many children to die every year, 
but are easily preventable. The brown envelope contains a $5 note, two $2 coins and a $1 
coin, so it is possible to donate any whole dollar amount, between $0 and $10 to World 
Vision. You are under no obligation to donate any money to World Vision unless you wish to 
do so.  
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Anonymity 
Your decision is completely anonymous. This task is designed in such a way that no-one will 
ever know how much any individual has given. Your privacy is guaranteed because neither 
your name nor your student ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions. The 
only identifying mark in all records will be the alpha-numeric code on your form and envelope. 
We have no way of knowing who has been assigned which code.  
Blue envelope 
We are also going to hand out a blue envelope containing a blue form with a space to indicate 
how much money,  if any, you wish to give to World Vision, and how much money this 
means World Vision will receive once we have matched your donation dollar for dollar. For 
audit reasons, we are only able to match any donation you make dollar for dollar if we have a 
written record of what has been donated, hence the need for you to complete this form. 
If you wish to make a donation put the money you wish to donate in the blue envelope and 
place this envelope in the box labelled “ECON” located on the ground floor in the main 
entrance of the Psychology building (the car park side, not the Cafe 101 side) tomorrow. You 
will have from 8am until 5pm tomorrow ([insert day of week and date]) to place the envelope 
in the box if you wish to make a donation. Note that donations will only be matched dollar 
for dollar if placed in the box between 8am and 5pm tomorrow. There is a map in the blue 
envelope showing the location of the Psychology Building.  
Remember if you choose to make a donation, you need to place the blue envelope, containing 
your donation and the completed blue form, in the red box in the Psychology Building 
between 8am and 5pm tomorrow ([insert day of week and date]). 
Receipt 
At the end of the session we will ask you one at a time to come up to the room at the back of 
the lab and sign a form acknowledging that you were paid $20 (the $10 show up fee and the 
additional $10). When you have done this, please leave the lab and do not wait around 
outside.  Remember if you wish to make a donation you can do this between 8am and 5pm 
tomorrow. Thank you once more for taking part in our study.  
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[The instructions below are for ND-2] 
Instructions: Decision-making task 
Thank you for participating in this research project, which should take no longer than 30 
minutes. 
Show up fee 
You have all received your $10 show up fee when you arrived at the lab. We will get you to 
sign a receipt for this before you leave. 
Decision-making task 
We are now going to undertake the decision making task. We ask that you listen quietly to 
the following instructions and do not speak until you have left the lab. If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
Donation 
We will shortly hand out to you a brown envelope containing $10. This money is being given 
to you in addition to your $10 show up fee.  You can either keep this additional $10 for 
yourself, or donate some, or all, of it to World Vision New Zealand, who are a registered 
charity doing development work in poor countries overseas. Any money you choose to 
donate to World Vision will be matched by us dollar for dollar (in other words, we will 
double your donation) and we will forward all money directly to World Vision. World Vision 
will use this money to provide vaccinations to protect children in poor countries (e.g. in 
African countries like Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) against measles, whooping cough, 
diphtheria, hepatitis, polio and tetanus. These diseases cause many children to die every year, 
but are easily preventable. The brown envelope contains a $5 note, two $2 coins and a $1 
coin, so it is possible to donate any whole dollar amount, between $0 and $10 to World 
Vision. You are under no obligation to donate any money to World Vision unless you wish to 
do so.  
Anonymity 
Your decision is completely anonymous. This task is designed in such a way that no-one will 
ever know how much any individual has given. Your privacy is guaranteed because neither 
your name nor your student ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions. The 
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only identifying mark in all records will be the alpha-numeric code on your form and envelope. 
We have no way of knowing who has been assigned which code.  
Blue envelope 
We are also going to hand out a blue envelope containing a blue form with a space to indicate 
how much money,  if any, you wish to give to World Vision, and how much money this 
means World Vision will receive once we have matched your donation dollar for dollar. For 
audit reasons, we are only able to match any donation you make dollar for dollar if we have a 
written record of what has been donated, hence the need for you to complete this form. 
If you wish to make a donation put the money you wish to donate in the blue envelope and 
place this envelope in the box labelled “ECON” located on the ground floor in the main 
entrance of the Psychology building (the car park side, not the Cafe 101 side.) You will have 
from 8am tomorrow ([insert day of week and date]) until 5pm [insert day of week and date] 
to place the envelope in the box if you wish to make a donation. Please note that you may 
place the envelope in the box any workday as the building will closed on Saturday and 
Sunday. Note that donations will only be matched dollar for dollar if placed in the box 
between 8am and 5pm from tomorrow for the next week. There is a map in the blue envelope 
showing the location of the Psychology Building.  
Remember if you choose to make a donation, you need to place the blue envelope, containing 
your donation and the completed blue form, in the red box in the Psychology Building 
between 8am and 5pm from tomorrow ([insert day of week and date]) until [insert day of 
week and date]. 
Receipt 
At the end of the session we will ask you one at a time to come up to the room at the back of 
the lab and sign a form acknowledging that you were paid $20 (the $10 show up fee and the 
additional $10). When you have done this, please leave the lab and do not wait around 
outside.  Remember if you wish to make a donation you can do this between 8am and 5pm 
from tomorrow until [insert day of week] next week. Thank you once more for taking part in 
our study.  
 
 
